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Anyone hoping to understand China and Chinese people’s behaviour in the 
present day must examine China’s long history and culture, as these often 
have crystallized into current behavioural patterns. This paper discusses one 
important push-out factor for Chinese students’ outbound mobility, and an 
element that is ignored in many futuristic predictions of international stu-
dent mobility: traditional Chinese educational culture. I conduct an in-depth 
analysis of three major aspects of Chinese educational culture in relation to 
Chinese students’ international mobility: the education-first culture, the sav-
ing culture, and the extended-family culture. I argue that these three aspects 
will continue to drive Chinese students’ outbound mobility.
Résumé
Si on veut comprendre la Chine et le comportement de son peuple aujourd’hui, 
il faut repenser à la longue histoire et à la culture de ce pays. En effet, le passé 
du peuple chinois se cristallise souvent dans ses modèles de comportement 
actuels. Cet article aborde un élément important de la mobilité des étudiants 
chinois vers des pays étrangers, élément ignoré par de nombreuses prédictions 
futuristes quant à la mobilité des étudiants internationaux, notamment quant 
à la culture éducative traditionnelle chinoise. L’auteur mène une analyse 
détaillée sur trois aspects significatifs de la culture éducative chinoise par 
rapport à la mobilité internationale des étudiants chinois : une culture qui 
privilégie l’éducation avant tout, une culture de l’épargne et une culture des 
familles élargies. Ces trois aspects de la culture éducative chinoise continueront 
à stimuler la mobilité des étudiants chinois vers des pays étrangers.
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China is currently the number one source country of international students around 
the world. From 1978 to 2013, the total number of Chinese students who went overseas 
to study reached over 3 million (EOL, 2014). In 2011 alone, the total number of Chinese 
students studying overseas was 339,700 (comprising 14% of students studying abroad 
around the world), among whom 90% were studying at their own expense (Yangtze Eve-
ning Post, 2012). 
Currently, there are 95,160 Chinese students studying in Canada—about one-third of all 
international students in Canada (295,505) (CBIE, 2014) and 10% of all Chinese students 
currently studying overseas. This makes Canada the fourth most desirable destination for 
Chinese students, after the USA (30%), the UK (21%), and Australia (13%) (EOL, 2014).
In 2008, Chinese students contributed over USD 15 billion a year to their host coun-
tries’ economies, almost half of China’s total higher education spending (Zha, 2011). Can-
ada derives CAD 8 billion annually from international student expenditures, including 
tuition and living expenses (Roslyn Kunin & Associates, 2012), and in 2009, international 
education as an industry created over 83,000 jobs and generated more than CAD 291 
million in government revenue (CBIE, 2014). As Chinese students comprise one-third of 
the total international student population, this means that Chinese students alone spend 
close to CAD 2.7 billion a year in Canada, contributing to nearly 18,000 jobs and generat-
ing CAD 97 million in government revenue. 
The huge tide of Chinese students flowing overseas for higher education, particularly 
self-supporting undergraduate students, has been much appreciated by cash-strapped 
universities in the West. In Canada, tuition fee income makes up about 23% of the aver-
age university’s operating budget, of which over 25% is contributed by international stu-
dents, who constitute about 10% of the university population (based on Statistics Canada, 
2012). While Western universities, mostly in English-speaking countries, step up their 
efforts in a fierce competition for Chinese students, they all seem to have a deep sense of 
concern and uncertainty over the future supply of Chinese students and the sustainability 
of the stream of revenue generated by international tuition fees. Given the context of such 
concern and uncertainty, Western universities eagerly seek accurate forecasts regarding 
trends in international student mobility. 
Current Models of Prediction
One important way to examine the pattern of international student mobility is to look 
at the push and pull factors (Altbach, 1998). Students are pushed to go overseas by un-
favourable conditions in their home countries. They are also pulled to come out by the 
favourable conditions offered by the host countries. 
The push factors, in the Chinese case, may include the fierce competition for admis-
sion into “brand-name” higher education institutions and the perceived poorer quality 
of education in third-tier and fourth-tier institutions, which may result in low chances 
of employment upon completion. Of course, one enabling push factor is the increase in 
household income that has made high international tuition fees affordable to more Chi-
nese families. The pull factors may include the perceived better quality of English-medi-
um education overseas, the ability to enter a particular program not available at home, 
the desire to gain overseas experience and international competence, and the intention to 
immigrate after graduation (based on Mazzarol & Soutar, 2001). 
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The pull factors seem to have stayed more or less stable over the past few decades in 
major destination countries, although these countries have had different policy changes, 
which have resulted in changes in the distribution of international students among them. 
What has been the focus in predictions about future international student mobility are the 
push factors. The most prominent push factors in the case of China are the Chinese de-
mographic trend, the development of Chinese higher education, and the trend of China’s 
economic growth. A good example of forecasting is the British Council and IDP Austra-
lia’s report Vision 2020. Forecasting International Student Mobility: A UK Perspective 
(Böhm et al., 2004). 
Demographic analysis typically examines the tertiary age population in China, which 
is an indication of the demand for higher education. The Chinese population is aging 
rapidly, given the national family planning policy established in the 1970s. The tertiary 
age population is dwindling, which is shown by the declining number of Chinese students 
taking national university entrance exams (Gaokao) from 2008 to 2013, with a change of 
trend only in 2014 (based on Sina Education, 2015). Between 2008 and 2011, the popula-
tion of Gaokao takers shrank by 1.4 billion (Zha, 2011) at a yearly rate of about 2.5%. 
What about the supply side? From 1999, China began its aggressive university expan-
sion plan. China aimed to reach 15% enrolment in higher education by 2010, an objec-
tive based on Martin Trow’s (1974) definition of “mass higher education” (Bai, 2006). 
The goal was achieved many years earlier than planned, with Chinese higher education 
enrolment growing at a yearly rate of 17% between 1998 and 2010 (Zha, 2011). In 1990, 
less than 4% of 18–22-year-olds enrolled as students in higher education institutions. By 
2005, the number had risen to 22%, with the total number of students in higher education 
exceeding 23 million in 2006 (Brandenburg & Zhu, 2007). As of 2011, an average of 78% 
of the Gaokao takers had the chance to go to an institution of higher learning (Zha, 2011). 
If we combine the effect of the declining rate of Gaokao entrants (2.5%) and the in-
creasing rate of higher education provision in China (17%), both being negative factors 
for Chinese students’ outward mobility, then we should have seen a yearly 19.5% decrease 
in Chinese students studying overseas during the past decade or so. However, what we 
saw was a 25% yearly increase between 1998 and 2013. The following chart shows the 
increase in Chinese students studying overseas from 2008 to 2014 (based on People.cn, 
2014; Wang, 2015):
Figure 1. Declining number of “Gaokao” takers (millions)
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The reason for the discrepancy might be economic trends in the past decade. Eco-
nomic analysis typically looks at whether the Chinese economy will continue to grow and 
to do so rapidly, and whether the wealth will trickle down and create more high-income 
families. Cross-nationally, economic analysis also examines the dynamics of the exchange 
rate, as a stronger renminbi (RMB) will make education abroad more affordable to the 
Chinese. As the whole world knows, the Chinese economy has grown at a yearly rate of 
about 10% in the past few decades, and the value of the RMB grew gradually but steadily. 
But even if we factor in this 10% growth rate into the formula, it is still not right. There 
seems to be one +34.5% factor missing. What is it?
+25% = (–2.5%) + (–17%) + (+10%) + (+34.5%?)
+25%: yearly increase in Chinese students studying overseas equals
___________________________________________________________________________________
–2.5%: declining rate of Gaokao takers (university-age population)
–17%: increasing rate of higher education provision in China
+10%: yearly rate of economic growth in China
+34.5%: the missing positive push factor
Chinese Educational Culture
Demographics and economics are necessarily very important variables in making 
predictions about future Chinese student mobility. But these are only synchronic factors 
based on what we can observe today. Many people from the West use the word “inscruta-
ble” to describe China and the Chinese people, a major reason being that they are unable 
to connect China today with China’s long history, unable to go beyond their fixation on 
the short Communist era and see the historical continuity in Chinese ways of thinking and 
ways of life for 5,000 years. To understand what is going on in China today, a diachronic 
analysis of what has happened in its extensive history is absolutely crucial. 
Without factoring in the long-standing and unique Chinese educational culture, any 
prediction of Chinese students’ mobility will be incomplete. In this position paper, I 
Figure 2. Increasing number of Chinese students studying overseas (millions)
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would argue that the big, mysterious push factor in the above equation, +34.5% being my 
attempt at a broad numerical estimate, is none other than traditional Chinese educational 
culture. However, culture is a very dangerous topic for discussion. Only hard-core cul-
tural essentialists can claim to be able to pin down a culture in an objective fashion. That 
said, only making neutral and generic claims about cultural differences, such as “every 
culture is complex and every individual in each culture is different,” is of little help for 
cross-cultural communication either. 
In the following, I will analyze three major aspects of Chinese culture that pertain to 
Chinese parents’ and students’ educational behaviours and China’s educational landscape 
today: (i) the education-first culture; (ii) the saving culture; and (iii) the extended-family 
culture. The analysis is based on personal reflection upon my educational experiences in 
China; this reflection has also been sharpened by my cross-cultural experience of living 
and working in Canada. I was born and raised in Mainland China and was educated there 
from kindergarten to PhD. I also taught in two Chinese universities. But my most active 
attempt to make meaning out of my experience in China started when I moved to Canada 
about four years ago, employed first as a postdoc in education and then as an international 
official in a major Canadian university, working on China relations. I began to read the 
work of other Chinese scholars who also had traveled across the Pacific Ocean to North 
America and subsequently reflected back on Chinese culture. Particularly significant were: 
Fung (1948) who was the first Chinese scholar to introduce Chinese philosophy systemati-
cally to Western readers; Lin (1935), who wrote about Chinese culture when living in New 
York City in the 1930s and whose book became a popular reference in North America for 
understanding China; and Fei (1992), who was trained in Western anthropology and wrote 
about Chinese sociology in the 1940s, at the height of the Japanese invasion of China. 
The pre-Communist literature on Chinese culture and society shows striking similari-
ties between what was observed then and what can be observed in China today. Some-
thing deep and fundamental about Chinese culture has not changed, despite the influx 
of Western influences in the modern era, socialism being one of them. Such consistency 
is also observable in modern Confucian scholars’ works (see, e.g., Tu, 2000). Although 
subject to gradual ongoing change, some of the Chinese cultural schemas, the ways of 
thinking ascribed to by the majority of the population, are, on the whole stable (Strauss 
& Quinn, 1997). The deep and fundamental part of Chinese culture that has to a large 
extent assimilated the invading alien cultures in history, the Mongolian and the Manchu 
cultures in particular, is gradually assimilating Marxist ideology, as shown in the prevail-
ing concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
Given my linguistic background, my attention was also drawn to the Chinese language 
and everyday idioms/sayings that demonstrate the Chinese attitude toward children’s 
education. According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, language encrypts human experi-
ence and human thoughts, but at the same it influences or even shapes the thinking and 
behaviour of its speakers (e.g., Cook & Bassette, 2010). The Chinese language that has 
recorded what the Chinese people experienced over their long history is also a window 
into the psychology of the Chinese people today. The semantically rich Chinese language 
provides a fertile ground for the hermeneutic meaning-making process of imagining what 
it was like to live during that extensive history. 
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When discussing qualitative issues such as culture, it is hard for subjectivity to be 
avoided, but in this paper I try to add rigor to my interpretive inquiry by triangulating my 
embodied transcultural experience with the existing literature and the everyday Chinese 
language that encodes the Chinese attitude toward education. This approach to the un-
derstanding of the Chinese educational culture aligns with van Manen’s (1990) phenom-
enological method, in which the author seeks the meaning of life through writing and re-
writing about the lived experiences of self and others. It also gains methodological insight 
from Clandinin and Connelly’s (2000) narrative inquiry, which stresses the importance 
of autobiographical narrative in the understanding of educational phenomena. The paper 
aims to be a good starting point for discussions on the issue of Chinese educational cul-
ture in Canada, as more and more educators have to deal with Chinese students one way 
or another in this part of the world. 
The Education-First Culture
The Chinese word “教to teach” literally means “to make filial.” Filial piety was one of 
the important aspects of Confucius’s teachings. Confucianism used to be one of the “hun-
dred different schools of thought blossoming” around the time Confucius lived (551–479 
BC). However, the rulers of China seem to have found Confucianism to be the ideological 
tool most conducive to consolidating their rules. According to a disciple of Confucius, You 
Zi, few filial and fraternal people wish to offend their superiors, and none wish to rebel 
(Gu, 2006). 
During the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), all other schools of thoughts were 
banned, leaving only Confucianism to be pursued. Since then, Confucianism has become 
the core curriculum of Chinese education (Gu, 2006) and has almost acquired the status 
of a state religion, although most scholars in China do not see Confucianism as a religion. 
According to Fung (1948), Chinese people have been so interested in philosophy that 
there has been no space in China for religion. In a similar fashion, Buddhism is practiced 
in China more as a philosophy of life than as a religion of gods.  
Traditionally in Confucian China, education was used to serve the goal of teaching mor-
al ethics to people. It is the Chinese tradition of education to put moral education above the 
teaching of skills in trades, the humanities above the natural sciences (Gu, 2006). Chinese 
philosophy, as Fung (1948) argued, regardless of its different schools of thought, is directly 
or indirectly concerned with government and ethics. What occupied the minds and hearts 
of Chinese thinkers was society, not the universe; the daily functioning of human relations, 
not hell and heaven; man’s present life, not his life in a world to come. Once, when Confu-
cius was asked by a disciple about the meaning of death, he replied, “Not yet understand-
ing life, how can you understand death?” (Analects, XI, 11; cited in Fung, 1948).
“Those who labour with their brains should govern those who labour with their brawn.” 
This household Confucian proverb in China serves to show that the goal of education has 
been to produce men of virtue who could serve in government positions. Throughout Chi-
nese history prior to the Opium War in 1839 (the first of a series of wars led by Western 
powers to invade China in modern Chinese history), education in China was overwhelm-
ingly concerned with how one should conduct himself in society and how to become a 
statesman (Gu, 2006). To Chinese parents, education has been a pathway to officialdom, 
not to careers as tradesmen or engineers. 
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This explains why Chinese parents today still insist on their children going to univer-
sities instead of vocational schools or colleges, despite some university graduates having 
difficulty finding employment, and the high demand for skilled tradespeople in China. 
In Canada, high enrolments in humanities and social science seem to be blamed for the 
so-called skill gap, the dearth in engineers and other skilled workers; in China, working 
in government as a civil servant has been the most sought-after career path for many. 
To many Chinese parents, white-collar jobs are the only acceptable occupations (Biao & 
Shen, 2009). To address the shortage of skilled workers in China, the government recent-
ly announced its plan to convert some 600 universities into vocational colleges (Roberts, 
2014). However, we will need to wait and see how long it will take the government’s action 
to change Chinese parents’ attitude toward their children’s educational choices. 
One historical development that strengthened the position of Confucianism in Chinese 
society was the imperial civil service examination system, known in China as “Ke Ju.” This 
system existed for 1,300 years, from 605 (when it was established in the Sui Dynasty) to 
1905 (when it was abolished in the Qing Dynasty). Through this system, all male adults 
in China, including those from humble social and economic origins, could change their 
fates by working hard on their learning and outperforming others in the exam (Lin, 1935). 
Many Chinese scholars have criticized the system for the rigidity of its content and for-
mat, which in turn restricted people’s thinking and scope of learning. However, the sys-
tem also left important legacies. First, it weakened the hereditary power of the nobility by 
helping the descendants of nobility rid themselves of such habits as laziness, degeneracy, 
and corruption (Gu, 2006). For this reason, some Chinese scholars, Lin (1935) for exam-
ple, have claimed that China’s has been a classless society, with each member on an equal 
footing in terms of upward social mobility. Second, it has resulted in the formation of the 
education-first culture in China, reflected in such household sayings as: “Everything else 
is inferior, education is the only lofty pursuit,” and “In books you will find beauties with 
complexions like jade, and houses made of gold.” 
Numerous stories circulated in China about young people of humble origin “borrow-
ing light to read from a rich neighbour by drilling a hole in the wall,” or borrowing money 
for the trip to the exam sites and “returning home in silk robes,” riding big horses as red 
as dates. These stories served to motivate young people to stay awake to read, “with their 
hair suspended from a beam and using an awl to prick into the bone.” In a way, I have 
strong connections with stories like these. Born and raised in one of China’s poorest rural 
areas, I was inspired by those success stories, and I myself have become a success story to 
many children in my village, as I have made my way to university and away from the farm 
through my hard work. 
The education-first culture can go a long way to explaining Chinese parents’ commit-
ment to their children’s education. Despite the fact that the returns on investment in edu-
cation in China are very low—about 3–5%, lower than the 10.1% world average and the 
9.6% Asian average, as well as the 11.2–11.7% range for low- and middle-income countries 
(Li, 2003)—individuals and families in China are still willing to invest in higher education 
as a means to secure both an expected higher income in the future and a more prominent 
social status, if they can afford to do so. 
The education-first culture has been driving the fast growth of the domestic higher 
education sector in China over the past two decades. According to Marginson (2011), the 
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fast expansion of the Chinese higher education sector since the 1990s has been driven not 
so much by increasing public or private investment, but rather by increasing household 
funding in the form of higher tuitions through the introduction of user-pay reform. The 
rise in tuition has not reduced the social demand for higher education. On the contrary, 
rapid tuition growth and massive university enrolment expansion have taken place side 
by side. The growing funding of tuition by households has also freed the government to 
invest selectively in a small group of elite universities through a differentiated funding 
model so as to compete with the world’s major-league universities. This development may 
be unique to China, given that Chinese parents’ “desires for (children’s) education [are] 
stronger at the level of the whole population than elsewhere in the world” (Marginson, 
2011, p. 595). One study in the USA showed that the price flexibility of demand for higher 
education in the USA was –0.62 (Leslie & Brinkman, 1988, cited in Dong & Wan, 2012), 
meaning that for every 10% increase in tuition fees, student enrolment dropped by 6.2%. 
The education-first culture has driven not only the rapid expansion of the domes-
tic higher education sector but also the increasing number of Chinese students studying 
overseas. Domestic higher education and overseas higher education do not seem to be in 
fierce competition yet, as the demand for higher education, no matter where, is so high. 
Some scholars have seen international education as part of the phenomenon of “over-
education,” which means that the educational returns are lower than the investments, 
and the skills acquired exceed the needs of the employer (Freeman, 1976; Tsang & Levin, 
1985; both cited in Biao & Shen, 2009). But Chinese parents do not seem to care whether 
their educational investment yields as much return.  
Chinese students who have finished their studies overseas and return to China for 
employment are often called “hai gui” (overseas returnees). The phrase sounds exactly 
the same as “sea turtle.” They once had some semantic connection as well. Both sug-
gested long voyages across the ocean; both were precious—the sea turtles are admired in 
Chinese culture for their longevity, and the overseas returnees were once precious and 
highly sought after by employers in China. However, in the past decade or so, the value of 
overseas returnees has depreciated by a large margin due to oversupply and improved do-
mestic higher education. Many of them returned to China after completing their overseas 
studies but failed to land desirable, high-paying jobs, becoming what are sarcastically 
called “seaweed” (hai dai) or “work-waiting returnees.”  
The risk of their children returning as “seaweed” does not seem to dampen Chinese 
parents’ enthusiasm for sending their children overseas. Returning to China as a “sea 
turtle” seems to be the lowest expectation of most Chinese parents for their children. The 
first option is always for them to study business at “world-class” universities, immigrate 
upon graduation, work in one of the world’s top 500 companies, and live in big, North 
American, suburban homes. I know that a very good polytechnic institute in Canada has 
been trying to promote their diploma programs to students in China, but with little suc-
cess. Chinese parents want their children to get at least a baccalaureate degree, if not a 
master’s or a PhD, preferably in one of the world’s top 100 universities. I also have heard 
about a Chinese girl who was sent by her parents to study business in Canada. While in 
Canada, she developed an interest in baking and decided to study that instead, which 
strained her relationship with her parents. 
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The Saving Culture
The Chinese word for home is “家(Jia),” an ideograph showing a pig under a roof. 
This may confuse Western learners of Chinese. How can it mean “home”? A pigsty would 
make more sense. To understand this word requires imagining the lives of Chinese people 
across their long history. For thousands of years, China was predominantly a rural soci-
ety. When the Chinese Communist Party began to lead China in 1949, only about 10% of 
the Chinese population lived in cities (Shan, 2011). Rapid urbanization has only taken 
place in China over the last 30 years, as surplus rural labourers were brought into the cit-
ies to manufacture cheap “Made in China” products for the Western market. Currently, 
half of Chinese people still live in rural areas. 
For a long time, Chinese farmers had very primitive and self-sufficient lives. Apart 
from the crops they grew, a pig was essential to the livelihood of a household, as it basi-
cally supplied all the meat needed throughout the year. This is the life my family has been 
living on a farm in northeastern China for as long as I can remember. Apart from feeding 
us, my mother’s main duty has been feeding a couple of pigs from the beginning to the 
end of each year. We sold one for cash and killed the other one for the Spring Festival. In 
summer 2011, when I last visited my father’s farm before I moved to Canada, I realized 
that this lifestyle had begun to change, as small-scale individual farms were starting to 
give way to larger-scale chicken farms and pig farms. 
Just as English speakers from North America may find it hard to understand the Chi-
nese character for “home,” Chinese learners of English find it hard to understand the 
English word “tornado.” What kind of wind is a tornado? Large areas of flat prairies in 
North America become good conditions for tornados to form, while in China there are 
too many mountains and hills for the tornados to develop. For the same reason, the per-
centage of arable agricultural land is lower in China. However, this has not stopped the 
Chinese people from producing many children. As I mentioned above, “filial piety” is the 
most important value of Confucianism, the ultimate goal of education. “The most serious 
of all violations of filial piety is failing to produce a male heir,” according to a household 
Chinese Confucian saying. All humans may take pride in passing on the family name, but 
the Chinese took it to the extreme. This resulted in the concentration of a quarter of the 
world’s population on 8% of the world’s arable agricultural land. 
Chinese people have always been hungry. “Have you eaten?” was, for a long time in 
Chinese history, the standard way people greeted each other, the equivalent of “How do 
you do?” or “How are you?” in English. Between 108 BC and 1911 AD, for example, there 
were over 1,800 famines in China, almost one a year in one location or another, resulting 
in the starvation and death of millions (Mallory, 1926). This seemingly eternal Chinese 
tragedy has forced people to try to eat anything that looked edible. Western people have 
the impression that the Chinese would eat anything that flies in the sky except for planes, 
and anything that runs on the land except for vehicles. Not only do they eat everything, 
but they eat every part of everything. When they eat the pigs, they eat the head, the face, 
the tongue, the brain, the liver, the heart, the kidneys, the intestines, the tail, and the feet. 
When they eat fish, they eat the fish head, the fish eyes, the fish brain and the fish tail. They 
eat different kinds of fish too, big or small, long or short, with or without prickly bones. 
When Westerners see a new organism, they might ask: “How can we classify this?”  When 
the Chinese see the same organism, they might ask: “How can this be cooked?” (Lin, 1937).
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In modern Chinese history, the 1839 Opium War started a century of Chinese humili-
ation, during which the Chinese suffered the Second Opium War (1856–1860), the Sino-
Japanese War (1895–1898), the Eight Western Country Invasion (1900), the Republican 
War (1911–1912), and the Chinese Civil War (1927–1937 and 1946–1949) with the eight-
year Anti-Japanese Invasion War in between (1937–1945). The most recent Chinese trag-
edy was a famine during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976); when the Chinese people 
finished eating the corns on cobs, they ate the cobs as well. After they finished the cobs, 
they turned to the leaves, barks, and roots of trees. After those were finished, they turned 
to frogs in the river. These are the stories I heard from elders back in my home village who 
experienced the Cultural Revolution. But Westerners do not need to pity the Chinese, a 
people who believe in the value of “eating bitterness.” One positive result of such bitter ex-
periences has been the richness and wide variety of Chinese cuisine. Given time and some 
ingenuity, the Chinese turned everything they ate into delicacies. When they were no longer 
poor, they started to enjoy the diverse culinary traditions of different parts of the country. 
However, through history, ruling such a large, hungry population has proven to be 
a very difficult task for any government. The Chinese government has never troubled to 
colonize other countries or regions, even though they had the technical capacity, as they 
were kept too busy domestically (Jacques, 2012). And the Chinese people, throughout 
their long history, have seen dynasties come and dynasties go, none of which was able to 
fundamentally change their fate. Over time, the Chinese people have learned to become 
cynical about governments and social change. The cycles of ups and downs have also 
made them terribly patient. In times of war and social unrest, they have continued to sip 
their tea and play their chess, waiting for the fortune to change (Lin, 1935). 
“The sky is high, and the emperor is far away.” This old Chinese saying well captures 
the kind of life Chinese people have been living. They do not believe in God (the sky). It is 
too high above. Without an almighty god in their minds and hearts, their lives have been 
balanced between Confucianism and Taoism (Lin, 1935), two very different philosophies 
but somehow working together for the benefit of Chinese people. Confucianism encour-
ages people to actively engage in social affairs, pursuing a government career if possible. 
Taoism encourages people to withdraw from the messiness of society and pursue inner 
harmony by living a simple life close to nature. As Lin (1935) said, Chinese people are 
Confucianists when they are successful and Taoists when they experience failure. 
The Chinese people did not believe in the emperor either. He was too far away. They 
have had very low expectations regarding social welfare from the government. Storm 
“Sandy” victims (2012) in the USA angrily demanded, on television, that the government 
“help and help right now.” The Sichuan earthquake (2008) survivors simply shed tears in 
front of the media, feeling sad for themselves. The best government, in the view of Chi-
nese people over their long history, has been one that left them alone. They “feared gov-
ernment tax collectors more than tigers,” a phrase based on a Confucian story in which a 
family chose to live in a tiger-roaming area to avoid government taxation. Apart from the 
slight psychological warmth they may derive from worshiping their deceased families, the 
Chinese people have learned to be self-reliant. 
This spirit of self-reliance has resulted in the Chinese people having a saving culture. 
“Thatch your roof before it rains.” China’s household savings rate is higher than in any 
other country; Chinese people typically save about a third of their total incomes (Liu, 
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2014). Hence, while the Canadian Minister of Finance is urging Canadians to save, the 
Chinese government is trying to figure out how to make people spend more. However, 
no matter how hard the government tries to stimulate domestic consumption, the Chi-
nese continue to save on a big scale. As mentioned above, saving has been a necessity for 
survival during the course of Chinese history. Precautionary saving for an unpredictable 
future is still a major economic reason behind Chinese saving behaviour, given the coun-
try’s less than satisfactory social and health care systems. Compared with Canada, whose 
social welfare system is more socialist than China’s, Chinese people have to save up in the 
event of major diseases, and for their children’s higher education. But increasingly, saving 
is no longer an absolute necessity but instead continues more as a habit. Just as the lack 
of cow’s milk in Chinese history has resulted in Chinese people’s lactose intolerance, their 
saving behaviour is “in their blood.” 
Saving is the habit not just of individuals and households but of corporations and 
the country as a whole. It is a valuable habit, especially in the context of the financial 
crisis that resulted from lavish spending and virtually no saving in the Western world. 
Many Canadians may wonder how Chinese families can afford to send their children to 
go to university in Canada, where each international student needs to spend at least CAD 
30,000 a year. That is 23 times the per capita annual disposable income of urban resi-
dents in China (in 2007) and 70 times that of rural residents’ (Biao & Shen, 2009). When 
Canadian parents are complaining about the high cost of higher education, how can Chi-
nese parents afford to pay international tuition fees, which are typically three times as 
high as domestic fees? In addition, given the current exchange rate of about five RMB to 
the Canadian dollar, the answer lies partially in the Chinese saving culture. 
Chinese parents are highly committed to supporting their children’s schooling, as was 
analyzed above. Most middle- or lower-middle-class families, a soon as children are born, 
economize on food and clothing on a daily basis to save for their children’s education. 
Chinese parents, especially those on salaries, might have saved for ages for their only 
child’s education expenses. They have a frugal lifestyle, spending only on the mere essen-
tials. If their savings are not enough, they are willing to “break their cooking wok to sell as 
scrap iron” (another Chinese saying) to pay for their children’s tuitions. Parents in North 
America let their children take out loans to pay for college fees. This would be a disgrace 
for Chinese families. 
The Extended-Family Culture
The essence of the Confucian value system is “benevolence” or simply “love.” The Chi-
nese character for “benevolence” is “仁ren,” with the left radical representing “人” (people) 
and the right radical representing “二” (two). As the formation of the Chinese character 
shows, “benevolence,” or Confucianism as a whole, is about the moral principles that regu-
late the person-to-person relationship. “There should be affection between father and son, 
righteousness between king and subject, difference between husband and wife, order be-
tween older and younger brother, loyalty between friends.” It was Confucius’s idea that, if 
everyone in society is assigned a specific role and people in different roles interact accord-
ing to certain rituals and protocols, the world will be at peace. 
If we look more closely, we may realize that the five relationships mentioned above—
father–son, king–subject, husband–wife, older–younger brother, and friend–friend—are 
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discussed together in no particular order, such as family first, non-family second. This 
shows that, to Confucius, the hierarchical relationship between father and son can be 
applied to the other sets of human relations: “Fathers as fathers and sons as sons.” The 
value of filial piety dictates that sons are supposed to submit and listen to their fathers 
and other elders. The same rule applies to the husband–wife and older–younger brother 
relationships, with the latter submitting to the former. The rule also applies to the king–
subject and friend–friend relationships. The king’s man should listen to the king, just as 
a son listens to his dad. In a friendship, younger buddies should listen to older buddies, 
just as younger brothers listen to older brothers. 
In the eyes of many Westerners, this is a backward, authoritarian system that should 
be changed to their democratic and humanitarian ways. However, such a belief tends to 
fail to see the complexity of a system that may not be democratic in Western terms, but is 
highly humanistic. The emperor ruled with the “Mandate of Heaven,” but to deserve the 
Mandate awarded to him, the emperor needed to rule with the utmost level of ethics and 
humanism. Any natural disaster, which was a yearly occurrence (as mentioned above), 
could be interpreted as the withdrawal of the “Mandate of Heaven” and thus conferred 
the right for a social uprising to remove the emperor from his throne (see, e.g., Jacques, 
2012). The father has the absolute authority in the family, but he also has the absolute 
responsibility to provide for the family, and this responsibility lasts beyond his children’s 
18th birthday. Chinese parents are supposed to save and pay for their children’s universi-
ty education, as mentioned above. Chinese parents are also supposed to contribute to the 
down payment and furnishing of their children’s first house; once the house is in place, 
they are supposed to pay for their children’s weddings as well. 
Chinese people retire early, men at 55 to 60 years old, women at 50 to 55. Many West-
erners may see the deprivation of the right to work after a certain age as discriminatory. 
However, many Chinese seniors do not seem to mind this. Instead of having nothing to 
do, they take up a new job right after retirement, helping to look after their grandchildren 
while both parents work full-time. Canadian grandparents may come and visit a newborn 
for a week or two; when my first son was born in 2007, my in-laws moved in and basically 
took over the baby! It is the responsibility of the parents and the grandparents to raise 
and educate the only child in the family.
According to Fei (1992), Chinese society is organized according to different principles 
from those prevailing in the West. Western society can be compared to a haystack of 
straws collected together. People organize into social groups through voluntary, unam-
biguous membership. It is voluntary because each individual has the freedom to join or 
leave. It is unambiguous because members of each group have clearly delineated rights 
and responsibilities. It is a haystack with each straw as a free individual joining the group 
as an equal member. 
The haystack-style of social organization is based on the Western individualistic tradi-
tion, according to Fei (1992). Each individual is a soul-bearing self, linked to the creator, 
God. The individual’s identity is defined not by the people around him in a social organi-
zation but by his connection with God. In Canada, only about 5% of the population goes 
to church regularly, but in the 2011 Canadian census, 67% of Canadians claim adherence 
to Christianity (Statistics Canada, 2014). When the majority of the population declares 
themselves the followers of one God, the government tends to have a very easy time rul-
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ing. Constitutions in Western societies typically connect with Christianity by declaring 
that they protect the rights of all individuals as being created equal. It is by connecting 
with God that the government gains its legitimacy to rule, although the church and the 
government have long been severed. God often appears in their currencies and national 
anthems. In Canada, people do not seem to trust the government very much and are often 
cynical about government policies. But consciously or subconsciously, Canadians tend to 
subscribe to a set of higher moral principles informed by Christianity. God is omnipres-
ent. If one is to be accountable to God, he needs to be on his best behaviour at all times 
and in all places. My observation in Canada seems to align with Fei’s (1992) analysis, al-
though there are always exceptions. 
Different from a haystack, the Chinese people’s social organization can be compared to 
the ripples flowing out from the splash of a rock thrown into water (Fei, 1992). The ripples 
feature overlapping networks of people linked together through differentially categorized 
social relationships. The centre of each network is a nuclear family. The family expands 
outward to bring in other people into a bigger pseudo-family network. The network con-
nects the individual with other individuals through different relational ties, called Guanxi. 
Each Guanxi is strictly personal, and its maintenance is based on principles of reciprocity 
and personal obligations. In this way, there are no formal channels for social operations. 
There are only personal ones. If one wants to get things done, the first impulse is always 
to seek Guanxi, or personal relationships. My experience seems to show that the formal 
public channel is more open and more available to people in Canada. I, as a foreigner, can 
get the same information from any government office as any Canadian citizen. 
What is important to point out here is that the moral standards in a Guanxi network 
are situational, not universal. To be more specific, in the ripple network in China, one’s 
obligations to family and kinship ties closer to the centre of the network override the ob-
ligation to more distant Guanxi ties. What is practiced in the centre of the family network 
is a very ideal form of communism, whereby resources are managed and allocated not 
equally but collectively according to needs. Based on the education-first culture, resourc-
es are overwhelmingly channelled toward the education of what is often the only child in 
the family, as a priority. 
The tight and extended family network has resulted in the historic resilience of Chi-
nese culture at large. China was ruled by the Mongolians for a century (1271–1368), a 
period called the Yuan Dynasty. China was ruled by the Manchurians for nearly three 
centuries (1644–1911), a period called the Qing Dynasty. In the eyes of Chinese historians, 
these two periods were integral parts of the continuous flow of Chinese history. They are 
not regarded as China falling under the rule of foreign invaders. China boasts 56 ethnic 
groups, with Han people comprising over 90% of the population. The Mongolians and the 
Manchurians are considered two minority groups in China. Indeed, in terms of culture 
and language, the Chinese language and Han culture stayed intact during the rule of the 
non-Han “aliens” that the Great Wall was supposed to keep at bay. Instead of being as-
similated by the incoming ruling cultures, the Han culture assimilated the alien cultures. 
According to Lin (1935), the tight family structure was the very reason why Chinese cul-
ture has maintained continuity despite the invasions of external groups and cultures.
How does Chinese family culture relate to the mobility of Chinese students overseas? 
Wouldn’t the extended family affection serve to keep Chinese students (in most cases the 
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only children of their families) at home, close to their parents and grandparents, instead 
of pushing them overseas? To understand this seeming contradiction, we might need to 
resort to a bit of the yin-yang dialectic, the tension and yet the union between two oppo-
site tendencies. One Chinese saying that is often quoted to defend the practice of physi-
cally punishing children is, “Hitting is caring, scolding is loving,” similar to the Western 
concept of “tough love.” It is not an easy decision for Chinese parents to send their chil-
dren overseas for education, as they are aware of the difficulties their children will have 
to go through to succeed: language barriers, culture shock, independent living, homesick-
ness, to name just a few. But they are convinced that children need to “eat bitterness” (a 
Chinese phrase mentioned above) in order to achieve bigger success. 
High achievement in learning is seen as an ethical act of filial piety, as an educated and 
successful offspring brings honour to the family and protects the prosperity and continu-
ation of the line (Marginson, 2011). In the extended family culture, one’s value is mea-
sured not on an individual basis but by how he or she contributes to the prosperity of the 
family network. Whether a student goes overseas to study is often not an individual deci-
sion made by the student, but a collective decision made by the whole family. One impor-
tant reason for the mobility of Chinese students overseas is the “whole family” approach 
to reproducing social advantage within families (Brooks & Waters, 2011). International 
tuition fees might generate a big financial burden, but the burden is mitigated when the 
high-saving parents, two sets of high-saving grandparents, and numerous high-saving 
aunts and uncles decide to pitch in. 
My discussion in this paper so far has focused solely on adult Chinese students attend-
ing overseas institutions of higher learning. However, a major trend in Chinese students’ 
overseas education is that students are studying overseas at an increasingly younger age 
(EOL, 2014). Homestay is one arrangement, while the “astronaut” family is the other, 
wherein one parent, typically the mother, relocates to manage the children’s schooling 
overseas, and the other parent, typically the father, stays in China to look after his career 
or business (Huang & Yeoh, 2005; Waters, 2002). In the astronaut arrangement, parents 
have to make tremendous sacrifices, such as separation, loneliness, and other hardships. 
However, Chinese parents still deem the plan worthwhile, as it ensures better education 
opportunities and better futures for their children. Most, if not all, Chinese people are 
familiar with the story of Mencius’s mother moving house three times to ensure the most 
conducive educational environment for her son. Chinese parents are willing to give up 
their convenience and personal comfort to find or create such a good educational environ-
ment for their children. It is the share of the “bitterness” parents have to “eat.” 
Discussion
To say that only the Chinese emphasize their children’s education is almost offensive 
to other cultures, as parents of all cultures would like to give their children the best, in-
cluding the best education. However, Chinese parents might be unique in the extent of 
the sacrifices they are willing to make so that their children can get the best education 
possible, irrespective of the return. The Chinese education-first culture is partly rooted 
in a highly competitive social structure, the result of a large population and scarce educa-
tional resources. Compared with Canada, the income gap between white-collar workers 
and blue-collar workers in China has been historically large. Canadian parents can afford 
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to give their children more freedom in educational options, as tradespeople often make 
more money than office workers. Chinese parents tend to push their children as hard as 
they can, so that they can exhaust their intellectual potential in their schooling. Chinese 
parents often regard overseas education as a means of providing extra advantages in the 
fierce competition for scarce resources and opportunities (Biao & Shen, 2009).  
The Chinese education-first culture makes Chinese parents seek the highest educa-
tional options for their children, and the saving culture and extended-family culture are 
enabling factors that help prioritize the allocation of resources to their children’s educa-
tion. For K-12, Chinese parents want to send their children to the best public schools. This 
has driven up the housing prices in some school districts. If parents are not able to live in 
a good school district, they are willing to pay high “school selection fees” so that their chil-
dren can go to a better school away from their home district. When it comes to university, 
they want their children to go to a top-tier university, ideally in Beijing or Shanghai. If the 
family is sufficiently well off, they will consider sending their children overseas, prefer-
ably to the USA. Overseas higher education is generally perceived to be better than what 
is available in China. According to the 2014 Shanghai Ranking of the world’s top 500 uni-
versities (http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2014.html), 146 are from the USA, 
most of these leading the league table, while only 32 are from China, mostly at the bottom. 
Aside from the USA, Chinese parents tend to consider the UK, Canada, Australia, and 
other English-speaking countries. Apart from university rankings, English language is 
another factor in their choice of overseas education destinations. The global village we 
live in seems to have necessitated the existence of a global language. Despite the fact that 
the rise of the English language was connected to British colonial history, people around 
the world seem to accept rather uncritically the status of English as an international lin-
gua franca. English as an important part of the school curriculum since the later 19th cen-
tury has enjoyed very high social status in China. The policy of opening up to the outside 
world, implemented in China since the late 1970s has made English proficiency a highly 
valuable skill for employment in an export-oriented economy. Chinese parents see the 
value of investing in English-medium higher education.
The three elements of Chinese educational culture that have served to drive Chinese 
students’ international mobility are not new. They have been around for several dozen 
centuries and will remain, if not strengthen. The Chinese educational culture, given its 
consistent nature, will continue to drive Chinese students’ outbound mobility in the fore-
seeable future. The Chinese government has been increasing its investment in the Chi-
nese higher education sector, and Chinese universities are improving their performance 
in world university rankings. However, it might take a couple of decades, if not longer, be-
fore the top Chinese universities are on a par with their counterparts in the West. And in 
the foreseeable future, Chinese parents will continue to attach importance to English-me-
dium education. Language status and economic power go hand in hand. We are still not 
sure whether English has already reached its peak as a world language, similar to Latin in 
the Middle Ages and French in the 18th century. The only possible alternative to English 
as a world language might be Chinese, given the current state of economic development 
in the world. But again, in the foreseeable future, English will remain the world language. 
Will the Chinese government interfere with students’ outbound mobility for fear of 
brain drain? The Chinese policy on self-financed overseas education has been very consis-
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tent since 1981, and it is a very liberal policy: “support study overseas, encourage returns, 
and guarantee freedom of movement” (Biao & Shen, 2009). “When the leaves fall, they 
fall to their root.” Convinced by this Chinese saying, the government seems to believe that 
whether or not Chinese students return, having them study overseas will benefit China in 
the long run. In addition, despite the large absolute number of Chinese students seeking 
overseas education, they comprise only a small percentage of the total Chinese students in 
higher education. According to UNESCO statistics in 2005, only 1.85% of Chinese college 
students were studying overseas, compared with 3.03% from South Korea, 6.16% from 
Malaysia, and 22.8% from Hong Kong (UNESCO, 2007, cited in Biao & Shen, 2009). 
Given the huge demand for higher education in China, Chinese universities are still very 
selective in admitting students and do not need to compete with overseas universities.
On the supply side, the host countries of international students, given their financial 
interest, will continue to provide elite higher education opportunities to a world market 
(Findlay, 2010). Most host countries, including the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand, have long treated higher education as an important export industry. Apart 
from revenues in the form of tuition fees and living expenses, these governments also use 
international education as a base to recruit quality labour forces to fill the gap left by aging 
populations and low birth rates. At the same time, as global education caters to affluent 
families in the countries sending international students, it serves to strengthen the power 
of social elites and perpetuate the unequivocal social structure in these societies. This is the 
unethical dimension of global education that Western countries need to face. Take Canada, 
for example: at about the same time as the government mandated its universities to double 
their international student recruits in 10 years, it cut its direct foreign aid to 14 developing 
countries, including China. While benefiting from the financial gain and brain gain in inter-
national education, Canada needs to think about how to engage in development projects to 
help achieve education equity in the societies from which we receive students. 
Conclusion
Chinese behaviour patterns and deep cultural norms, shaped by historical experienc-
es, are typically beyond scientific analysis, as such analysis often stays at the surface of the 
phenomena, using currently observable or obtainable data, but fails to reach the depth of 
the old Chinese soul. In addition to economic and demographic factors, traditional Chi-
nese educational culture is another major push factor for Chinese students’ international 
mobility. The education-first culture encourages parents to try to send their children to 
the best institutions possible, as far as they can afford. At the current stage of history, an 
English-medium Western education is perceived by most Chinese parents as superior to 
a domestic one. The saving culture makes Western tuition fees affordable to many mid-
dle-class Chinese families. And the extended-family culture makes one student’s higher 
education a priority for the whole extended family. It is often a big family decision, with 
the commitment of resources from the whole family. These features of traditional Chinese 
culture, together with economic growth, will continue to drive the outbound mobility of 
Chinese students for a few decades to come. 
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